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On August 4, 2004, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
announced that the Media and Publications Division (MPD) would 
reduce its staffing by 60 percent and close two of its three operating 
locations.  At the same time they anticipated that overall performance 
would improve.  How is that possible?  The key is competition. 
The MPD was the third largest government publisher in the 
country.  It maintained an inventory of over 21,000 published 
products and delivered them using traditional paper printing, as well 
as by fax, CD-ROM, Braille, Internet, Intranet, etc.  The MPD 
maintained three Area Distribution Centers (ADCs) to handle public 
and internal requests for published products.  
With the increasing availability of digital publications, there was a 
decreasing demand for MPD’s paper copies—trend data showed a 6 
percent annual decline in workload at the ADCs.  For this reason the 
IRS chose to package and compete the work performed at the ADCs 
as part of their Competitive Sourcing Program.  This program focuses 
on reassessing agency functions to create a more efficient and 
effective organization through opening the work to competition 
between the (current) public sector and bidders from the private 
sector.  
The public employee team proposed a major restructuring and 
won the competition against the private sector bidders—promising 
improved performance with 60 percent fewer employees, and closing 
two of the three facilities.   
Forms of market-based government such as the competitive 
sourcing program at the IRS are changing the way government 
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provides services to the American public.  These methods present 
government agencies with options to transform themselves into more 
efficient organizations that can obtain the best value possible for the 
American taxpayer.  The competitive processes that these methods 
spark create the pressure necessary to achieve dramatic results, 
such as in the IRS case—no matter whether the winner of the 
competition is the public or private sector. 
BACKGROUND 
The federal government has had a long-standing policy neither to 
produce products nor to provide services that are available in the 
private sector.1  It has generally failed to uphold this policy.  In fact, 
throughout the last century, government, at all levels, has assumed 
the responsibility for the provision of more and more services; now 
federal, state, and local government spending make up one–third of 
the national gross domestic product.    
This expansion in the role of government, coupled with income tax 
cuts and the budgetary pressures of Social Security and Medicare, 
has resulted in large federal budget deficits.  The Congressional 
Budget Office estimated that the budget deficit will exceed $370 
billion for the 2006 fiscal year, and will be in the vicinity of $355 
billion in 2007 (Reuters, 2006).  David M. Walker, the Comptroller 
General, in his testimony on the state of the state of the federal 
budget, asserts that the fiscal deficit problem is so large that 
economic growth by itself will not be a sufficient solution (Walker, 
2005).  As a result, the federal government will face continued 
pressure to provide more and improved services, while maintaining or 
reducing costs. Market-based government, i.e., shifting from a 
monopoly to a competition-based environment for the provision of all 
but the “inherently governmental” functions, is one reasonable 
approach for improving the performance of government programs, 
while reducing their costs.   
The move towards market-based government began in earnest in 
the 1980s.  The early initiatives were with privatization and public–
private competitions under the auspices of Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. 
Many of the themes for privatization were formulated by Milton 
Friedman in the early 1960s in his book Capitalism, Freedom and 
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Democracy; key among those was his analogy between government 
and private monopolies.  This concept legitimized the criticism of big 
government, and anchored this criticism in classic microeconomic 
theory. There wasn’t much movement by the federal government to 
privatize, however, until the Reagan administration put privatization 
on the public agenda early in its first term.  The Reagan 
Administration emphasized the view that big government was 
inefficient, wasteful, and unmanageable; and, early in Reagan’s first 
term, the administration began to formulate aggressive proposals for 
the sale of a wide range of governmental assets. Proposals included 
the sale of federally owned park and wilderness lands, the Conrail 
and AMTRAK rail lines, as well as a major petroleum reserve. In 
Reagan’s second term, his administration coined the still unfamiliar 
term “privatization” under the argument that privatization was an 
adoption of private means to achieve public goals. The President’s 
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, defined privatization as an 
option “allowing Government to provide services without producing 
them” (Henig, 1989-1990, p. 662 ). 
The Clinton administration also recognized the need to reform the 
way government procures goods and provides services.  President 
Clinton initiated the National Performance Review (NPR), which 
served as an impetus for procurement reform.  The NPR effort 
broadened the goal of creating a government from one that “works 
better and costs less” to a government that works better, but is also 
smaller.  The NPR promoted the idea that government should focus 
its attention on those activities which it should and could do best, and 
then put incentives in place to insure optimum results (Gore, 1993, 
p.1).  These efforts resulted in a flurry of public-private competitions 
under the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, primarily 
within the Department of Defense. 
When George W. Bush took office in 2001, he claimed 
“competitive sourcing”2 as one of his top management initiatives. 
Bush stated that federal workers should compete with contractors for 
as many as 425,000 governmental jobs that were identified as 
commercial activities, i.e., a product or service that could be obtained 
from a commercial source (Bush, 2002).   
However, all of these initiatives were received with apprehension 
and resisted by many groups. From its onset, privatization faced 
heavy resistance from labor unions and congress.  And, despite the 
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growing evidence that competitive sourcing improves 
performance and decreases cost, it also continues to face strong 
opposition from federal employees, their unions, their political allies, 
and more recently, civil rights groups—all of whom are fearful of losing 
federal jobs.  For example, in 2003, thirty five senators signed a letter 
to the Office of Management and Budget, responding to the 
Administration’s competitive sourcing initiative by stating that they 
have “deep reservations about privatizing so much of the federal 
workforce” (Lee, 2003, p. A21).  Public unions continue to spend 
considerable resources trying to convince the public and Congress 
that monopoly provision by government agencies is the most effective 
way to produce public services, and should therefore, be maintained.  
As a result of the strong opposition from unions and lawmakers, the 
competitive sourcing initiative has been successfully slowed.  By 
2005, of the initial Bush goal of 425,000, only 50,000 jobs had been 
studied (Lee, 2006). 
Still other opponents of market-based government stipulate that 
competition rarely leads to savings and that the current monopoly-
based environment should be maintained. They believe that the 
public sector can, for the most part, provide the same services as the 
private sector for about the same cost (Sclar, 2000), however little 
data to support this position is provided.  In fact (as noted below) the 
data which does exist shows just the opposite i.e. better performance 
at significantly lower cost. 
Despite administration attempts to address the concerns of 
opposition groups, the resistance has not subsided.  When 
advocating these initiatives, administration efforts have often focused 
on reducing cost when presenting them to the public, while not 
addressing the more important effects of increased competition on 
improvement in the performance of the provision of services.  
Consequently the efforts were viewed as cost cutting measures, along 
with the expectation of reduced service quality, accompanied by 
layoffs of large numbers of government employees.  To date these 
market-based government initiatives have not resonated with the 
public in general.   
Along with privatization and competitive sourcing, outsourcing 
and public–private partnerships are two other available sourcing 




 Competitive Sourcing (a new term introduced by the Bush 
Administration for public-private competitions that are held in 
accordance with OMB circular A-76) has been employed by 
federal agencies for almost 40 years in an effort to improve the 
quality and flexibility of government services, and to save tax 
dollars. Competitive sourcing occurs when government and 
private sector providers compete to carry out commercial 
activities.  In 1966, OMB issued Circular A-76, which includes 
guidelines for federal executive agencies to evaluate whether 
commercial activities should be performed by government 
sources, by private sector sources, by another federal agency 
through an Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA), or through 
public/private competition (Gansler, 2003).  
 Outsourcing differs from competitive sourcing in several ways. 
With outsourcing, the government agency concludes, in advance, 
that the best way to achieve greater efficiency, higher 
performance, and substantial cost savings is to contract out the 
work to a private vendor. There is no competition between the 
government agency and the private vendor for the work to be 
performed. The “competition” is among the private vendors 
bidding for the contract to perform the work or perform the 
service.  Also, outsourcing is not the same as privatization.  
Through outsourcing, the workload is shifted from the in-house 
government providers to the private sector, but no sale or transfer 
of assets has occurred (Gansler, 2003).   
 Privatization is the transfer of assets or responsibility from the 
government to the private sector.  In many cases privatization 
often includes a wide range of public-private partnerships, such 
as voucher systems, commercialization, and franchising. Some 
even consider the creation of federal corporations, quasi 
government organizations, commercialization, and government-
sponsored enterprises as forms of privatization (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2004). 
 Public-Private Partnership is “an arrangement of roles and 
relationships in which two or more public and private entities 
coordinate/combine complementary resources to achieve their 
separate objectives through joint pursuit of one or more common 
objectives” (Lawther, 2002, p. 9). 
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The Federal Government’s Need for Market-Based Sourcing 
What is being asked of the federal government is essentially what 
was demanded of US private industry in the latter part of the 20th 
century in order to remain competitive. The goal of federal policy 
should be to create a government that looks a lot more like a 
dynamic, restructured, re-engineered, world-class business. There are 
many good examples of successful American businesses (FEDEX, 
Caterpillar, Dell Computers, etc.) which have come to rely on core 
competencies to do what they do best.  The federal government can 
learn from their successes to focus on public core competencies, 
such as policy, fiscal management, oversight, and warfighting.  For all 
other activities, the public sector must rely more and more on 
competition to achieve higher performance at the lowest cost, and to 
get the “best value” from either the private or the public sector. 
The overarching objective of market-based government is to 
introduce that competition, and wherever possible eliminate 
monopolies.  In addition to providing fewer services at higher prices, 
monopolies typically discourage innovation and improvement.  In 
2001 the Bush administration estimated that there were 
approximately 850,000 jobs that were not inherently governmental, 
and were currently being done on a monopoly basis by government 
workers (Peckenpaugh, 2001).  Rather than have work performed on 
a monopoly basis by government workers, market-based government 
would allow the private sector to also compete for these jobs.  After 
all, cutting grass, hanging drywall, or turning a wrench in a 
maintenance facility are not inherently government jobs.  However, 
after five years of implementation, only a small fraction of those 
positions have been competed—7,213 positions were competed in 
FY2005 (Office of Management and Budget, 2006). 
Numerous studies clearly show that when such work is 
competitively awarded—regardless of whether the public or private 
sector wins the competition—job performance improves, with a 
significant cost savings (Gansler, 2003; Savas, 2000).  In cases 
where it has been possible to quantify performance improvement, 
that improvement has averaged 109 percent (Gansler, 2003) with an 
average cost savings of over 30 percent, without a significant 
negative impact to federal employees (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2004).  
The most recent reported competitive sourcing results project a net 
saving of $3.1 billion for competitions completed in FY 2005 (Office 
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of Management and Budget, 2006). Market-based government is 
clearly one strategy that can be used to improve the government’s 
effectiveness and efficiency.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The aim of this chapter is to gain insight from a series of case 
studies of examples of market-based government sourcing 
alternatives.  The approach taken in conducting and analyzing the 
case studies was that recommended by Yin (Yin, 2002) and 
Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989).  This approach allows a theory to 
emerge inductively as a result of analyzing a series of case studies.   
The cases, summarized below, highlight how different 
organizations have implemented outsourcing, competitive sourcing, 
privatization, and public-private partnerships in an effort to achieve 
better performance and reduced costs.  This analysis focuses on the 
challenges organizations faced, the results they achieved, and the 
lessons learned.  Available data regarding pre-competition and post 
competition costs, as well as performance levels, was used to 
determine the gains of competition in all cases.  
CASES 
The IRS uses Competitive Sourcing (Lucyshyn & Young, 2004) 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) processes 13 million tax 
returns annually. Although in the mid 1990s the IRS had a large force 
of 100,000 employees, and an annual budget of $10 billion, the 
agency was criticized for several deficiencies. Despite the information 
revolution, the IRS was still processing tax returns using concepts and 
systems developed in the 1950s, including batch processing and 
magnetic tape storage on reels. In the late 1990s, the IRS began to 
take such deficiencies seriously and concluded that the key to 
providing improved services was modernization. A main incentive to 
modernize was the 2001 President’s Management Agenda that 
required all federal agencies to implement competitive sourcing.3  
The IRS adapted competitive sourcing as a tool in its overall 
modernization efforts, but put in place a very deliberative process, 
conducting business case analyses and reassessing the overall 
functions of the organization. Deciding which units to compete under 
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OMB A-76 guidelines was difficult; since, as of summer 2004, 
approximately 33 percent of IRS functions were categorized as 
commercial in nature.  The IRS finally decided to compete its Area 
Distribution Centers (responsible for written and telephone requests 
for documents) and its Campus Operations and Support; both 
competitions were won by the government employee unit, known as 
the Most Efficient Organization (MEO).  
The IRS Media and Publications Division (MPD) was the third 
largest government publisher and one of the top 10 high-volume 
mailers in the government and commercial fields. The MPD delivers 
products using traditional paper printing as well as through other 
formats – including fax, CD-ROM and Internet. The division 
maintained three Area Distribution Centers (ADCs) in Bloomington, 
Illinois; Richmond, Virginia; and Rancho Cordova, California. The IRS 
chose to group and compete all the work performed at the ADCs in a 
single competition. This approach made it possible to solicit bids for 
all aspects of the ADC functions. The winning IRS employee team 
proposed closing both the Virginia and California facilities, and 
eliminate 82 seasonal employees at the remaining Illinois facility. 
The competition of the IRS Campus Center Operations Support 
and Services sought a provider that could supply all services, 
materials, supplies, facilities, supervision, labor and equipment for 
support at all 10 IRS centers located throughout the US. The IRS 
chose to make a single award for all service centers. All bids were 
evaluated according to technical criteria, management criteria, and 
the past/present performance. Like the ADC competition, the public 
employee unit (MEO) won the bid. According to the MEO proposal, of 
the 278 technology-related positions that were competed across the 
10 centers, 218 would be eliminated.   This was possible because the 
MEO reengineered processes and redesigned the work. 
Although the public sector won in both cases, the existing 
processes were changed dramatically, and the resultant reductions in 
personnel were significant – 60 percent and 78 percent respectively.  
Strategic leadership, planning, and the impact of competition made 
possible these dramatic results.   
NASA Outsources Desktop Services (Lucyshyn & Maly, 2004) 
The NASA Outsourcing Desktop Initiative program (ODIN) is a case 
study of a successful Information Technology (IT) outsourcing 
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program.  In 1996, NASA approved the ODIN concept, which it 
defined as a “long-term outsourcing arrangement with the 
commercial sector which transfers to it the responsibility and risk for 
providing and managing the vast majority of NASA's desktop, server, 
and intra-Center communication assets and services as the Agency 
downsizes and refocuses IT personnel to Agency core missions” 
(Lucyshyn & Maly, 2004, p. 15) Through ODIN, NASA officials hoped 
to cut desktop computing costs, significantly increase service quality, 
achieve interoperability and standardization among NASA computer 
operations, and allow NASA employees to focus on their core 
responsibilities.   
After soliciting and reviewing nine proposals, the ODIN program 
awarded indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contracts to a 
pool of seven contractors.  Each NASA service center would then 
choose a contractor from the pool and use that vendor as its 
exclusive desktop service provider for a period of three years.  The 
contractors in the pool are not guaranteed sales—they must compete 
with each other for NASA’s business. 
One concern expressed by both government employees and 
managers prior to ODIN’s launch was the possibility of involuntary 
displacement of employees.  However, one of the objectives of the 
ODIN program was to shift government IT personnel from 
administrative support to core missions, so in practice, ODIN caused 
zero involuntary personnel displacements.  Overall, the ODIN program 
minimized the negative impact on employees, while refocusing 
government personnel on core research and development activities.   
Since the ODIN program was introduced, NASA research centers 
have seen significant changes.  Although the previous support met 
the minimum required service levels, the age of the equipment varied 
widely, with some organizations using computers that were up to ten 
years old.  This variety of equipment created issues and challenges 
with standardization, interoperability, and security.  Since, the 
computers and IT support were sourced from several organizational 
levels; there was no adequate way to allocate all costs.  Under the 
ODIN contract the age of the equipment across the agency is much 
more consistent, with a range up to three years, and an average age 
of 18 months. Because hardware and software are standardized 
across each center, interoperability and security are significantly 
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improved.  The service provided by the ODIN contracts now generally 
exceeds required service levels, as well as a firm-fixed price per seat.   
Auxiliary Power Unit Logistics Support Program (Lucyshyn, Rendon, & 
Novello, 2005) 
In April 1998, the Navy chose to begin its first public-private 
venture.  The program manager for the F/A-18 fighter Auxiliary Power 
Unit4 (APU) at the Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point (NADEP-CP) was 
tasked with developing and implementing a partnership between 
NADEP-CP and private industry to help reduce the cost of managing 
and distributing repairable F/A -18 auxiliary power units and to 
increase system reliability, maintainability, and related spare parts 
availability.  Naval aviation depots are responsible for the repair, 
rebuilding and overhauling of aircraft weapons systems.  
NADEP-CP was constantly challenged with providing a steady 
stream of overhauled APUs to the fleet commanders due to an 
increasing inventory of aging APU components, poor spare parts 
support, and rapidly decreasing mean flight hours between 
unscheduled APU removals.  
Moreover, in the late 1990s, the Depot was facing an increasing 
backlog of APUs in need of repair.  The APU availability had decreased 
to approximately 65 percent, the customer wait-time was as high as 
35 days, and repaired units were delivered on-time only 20 percent of 
the time.  At the same time maintenance costs were increasing 
significantly. The need for a new approach was evident.  The program 
manager believed that a public-private partnership would serve the 
dual purpose of improving support for the F/A-18 program and also 
maintaining the Navy’s organic maintenance capability. 
The envisioned partnership would have the private contractor 
responsible for overall program execution, along with the 
procurement and management of all consumable parts used by 
NADEP-CP to repair APUs.  NADEP-CP would focus on its core 
competency of the repair and overhaul of the APUs.  Such a 
partnership would involve a direct vendor delivery (DVD)/total 
logistics support (TLS) arrangement; in this case, responsibility for 
reliability and maintainability would be shifted to the private sector. 
The approved business case analysis of the arrangement concluded 
that the Navy would save $13.8 million over ten years by awarding 
the DVD/TLS contract to Honeywell. The Naval Inventory Control Point 
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(NAVICP) later identified other quantitative benefits of the contract 
totaling $34.8 million. 
There was a natural resistance to the plan based on a fear of 
public sector job loss.  The management team worked hard on their 
communications reassuring depot employees and union 
representatives that the partnership would not significantly affect the 
employee status quo, as well as gathering Congressional support.  
In June 2000, NADEP-CP signed a ten year (five base years with 
five one-year renewal options) Firm Fixed Price, performance-based 
contract with Honeywell (Caterpillar Logistics as a major 
subcontractor). The contract is priced by the flight hour, under which 
the contractor does not price each repair part individually, but 
develops prices based on total contract cost; as a result the Navy now 
knows the cost of maintaining the APUs and can budget accordingly.  
Under this contract, Honeywell, as the prime contractor, procures 
and manages all consumable items used by the depot to repair the 
APUs and subcontracts the repair effort back to the depot on a cost-
reimbursable basis.  Honeywell subcontracts data management, 
inventory management and parts delivery to Caterpillar Logistics.  
This partnership between NADEP-CP and Honeywell proved to be 
very successful. Performance data between July 2000 and October 
2002 showed great improvement on APU maintenance and 
availability. The availability improved from 70 percent to 90 percent.  
The number of APUs awaiting depot repair because of lack of parts 
decreased from 118 to zero. Back orders were reduced from 125 to 
26 and average delivery time went from 35 days to 5.4 days. Overall, 
98 percent of requisitions were filled within the contractual 
requirements. In 2004, NAVAIR provided further signs of success. 
APU back orders for five additional aircraft models decreased to zero 
and supply availability increased to 97 percent (Heron, Personal 
Interview, 2006, April 21).  
Public Private-Partnerships to Supply C-130 Parts (Lucyshyn & 
Roberts, 2004) 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is a Department of Defense 
(DoD) combat support agency that provides material support to the 
military services.  In an effort to improve the integration of its supply 
chain, DLA expanded the prime vendor concept, calling it the next 
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generation “Virtual Prime Vendor” (VPV).  In the VPV model, the 
vendor generally manufactures some products, and purchases and 
stores other manufacturers’ products as needed.  In 1996 DLA chose 
to implement the VPV concept to provide parts and consumables for 
the maintenance of C-1305 aircraft propeller assemblies at the 
Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) at Robins Air Force Base, 
Georgia.  DLA hoped that by building an integrated PV-run supply 
chain, the parts for the C-130 would be shipped faster and cheaper, 
while the DLA itself would manage the Prime Vendor contract rather 
than the actual inventory. 
Prior to DLA’s virtual prime vendor initiative, the Department of 
Defense’s efforts to expand the use of prime vendor contracts had 
been primarily restricted to commercial supplies, such as food and 
medical supplies.  DLA’s contract with Hamilton Standard to supply 
components for the C-130 military cargo plane, under a virtual prime 
vendor contract, was the first major attempt to apply the concept to a 
key component of a major weapons system. 
In 1996, the Defense Supply Center Richmond (DSCR), DLA’s 
lead center for aviation support, requested proposals for establishing 
government-industry VPV relationships in support of weapons 
systems maintenance.  The team received 14 abstracts; seven of the 
contractors were asked to follow up with specific submissions.  
Ultimately, the team found that the Hamilton Standard C-130 engine 
proposal was a perfect candidate for a prototype VPV effort.  Not only 
did Hamilton Standard already produce approximately half of the 
consumable parts (by value) for the C-130 propeller assembly, but it 
also had significant ties with the contractors who provided the other 
parts.  
On October 10, 1996, under the auspices of the VPV program, 
the contract was awarded to Hamilton Standard—an initial one-year 
indefinite-quantity contract for DLA consumables, with four one-year 
options; the estimated yearly value of the contract was $22 million. 
This contract was based on specific metrics that were chosen to 
incentivize performance, rather than the quantity of parts sold.  The 
metrics were based on system availability, customer service, and 
order-to-receipt time, rather than number of orders placed, number of 
repairs etc. In fact, the acquisition plan specified that the VPV’s 
management should have a significant impact on key metrics while 
also developing “reliable/consistent delivery on a required delivery 
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date, expedite[d] processing services, and surge capability” (Lucyshyn 
& Roberts, 2004, p. 69).  The VPV was required to submit these 
metrics for review and evaluation.  After the first C-130 Propeller 
Assembly VPV Contract expired in June of 2002, DLA revised these 
metrics for the follow-on contract with Hamilton Sundstrand.6
Since it re-awarded the VPV contract to Hamilton Sundstrand, DLA 
has continued to reduce its remaining inventories. Beginning in 
September 1994 with an inventory valued at $12 million, the 
inventory was reduced to $222,000 in 1996—a reduction of 98 
percent.   
DLA then re-evaluated and modified the metrics that it uses to 
monitor the contractor’s performance. The metrics used in the new 
contract are Contractor Performance Time (CPT) and Time on 
Backorder (TOB).7 Additionally, the current contract has added a 
Contract Incentive Plan, which provides a method to motivate the 
vendor to exceed performance requirements- the vendor can earn 
additional service fees for exceeding CPT and TOB performance 
requirements, but earns negative points when failing to meet the 
minimum requirements.  As of September 2004, the vendor has 
surpassed all contract performance requirements. For example, DLA 
required the contractor to ship 90 percent of delivery orders within 8 
days, but in September of 2004, Hamilton Sundstrand was shipping 
99.4 percent of all orders within the required time (Brown, 2004).  
While integrating government supply chains is difficult for large 
and complex networks, this case demonstrates that the virtual prime 
vendor model can work, even for large, complex military weapons 
systems. 
The US Navy Uses Privatization-in-Place for the Naval Ordnance 
Station, Louisville (Lucyshyn & Novello, 2005) 
Privatization-in-place has been attempted at only a handful of 
military facilities around the country, and the Louisville Depot was the 
first to complete the process. 
By the 1990s, the Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville (NOSL) was 
the only Navy facility able to provide both major overhaul and 
complete engineering and technical support services for the Navy’s 
surface weapons systems. Despite NOSL’s unique capabilities, in the 
post-Cold War years, the facility suffered from excess capacity.  By 
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1993, the Louisville depot had a maximum potential capacity for 3.8 
million direct labor hours, but was only performing 1.3 million hours 
of work, only 34 percent utilization.  The depot was put on the Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) list for the 1993 round but escaped 
closure.  The Mayor of Louisville had anticipated that the depot 
closure would result in the loss of 1,200-1,400 jobs and a reduction 
in local payroll of more than $25 million.  When the depot was put on 
the BRAC list again for the 1995 round, city officials decided to 
recommend the privatization of the whole depot operation and began 
to work with United Defense (a defense contractor that produced 
some of the major systems maintained at the depot) on a detailed 
plan.  
Over a period of four months, a United Defense team worked 
intensely with individuals at NOSL to gain a better understanding of 
the NOSL enterprise, with its 40 product lines. Two of the products 
constituted 60 percent of the work. However, one of those two main 
product lines, the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System, was outside of 
United Defense’s production portfolio.  Key NOSL personnel 
recommended that they also bring in Hughes Missile System 
Company (now Raytheon), the Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM) for Phalanx into the arrangement. With Hughes in the picture, 
the United Defense team continued to work with the Louisville 
stakeholders to collaboratively create a plan to privatize the NOSL 
business in place.  
The city of Louisville successfully lobbied the plan and in June 
1995, the BRAC commission recommended privatization of the NOSL 
facility and workload. In August of 1995, President Clinton accepted 
the recommendation. The Navy estimated that transferring the work 
to other naval facilities would cost approximately $302 million, while 
the privatization-in-place would cost $170 million less.  
Although Louisville had worked closely on a privatization plan with 
United Defense, it decided that it was going to compete the business 
among multiple companies.  The idea was that with competition 
would come concessions and a more favorable contract for the city 
and residents of Louisville.  United Defense won the contract.  The 
final agreement between Louisville and United Defense consisted of a 
series of different types of contracts over designated time periods. 
The performance contract covered a six week based period (August 
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19 – September 30, 1996), plus five one-year option contracts 
corresponding to governmental fiscal years 1997 through 2001. 
In preparation for a “hot turnover” United Defense took steps to 
address concerns about displaced employees.  As a result, all 
employees were offered jobs with benefits similar to those they had 
with NOSL.  Of the 234 offers made, 189 people accepted.  
Ultimately, the privatization of NOSL was a win-win-win situation 
for the Navy, the city, and the two private defense contractors 
involved.  The Navy eliminated the overhead costs of operating the 
depot while retaining key naval gun manufacturing skills.  In addition, 
the quality of work in the gun facility improved dramatically—the 
number of defects per 1000 hrs of direct labor was reduced by 77 
percent, productivity per employee was increased by a factor of 5, 
and delivery performance was 99 percent.  The city of Louisville 
saved jobs that it would have completely lost with the closure of the 
depot. It is estimated that in 2004 the payroll at depot was around 
$30 million.  Finally, United Defense significantly increased plant 
productivity, while simultaneously streamlining the workforce; and 
Raytheon also increased productivity, as well as experiencing a rise in 
demand for the Phalanx product and growth in the number and types 
of products assembled.  
RESULTS 
Overall, these five cases show that when a market-based 
government strategy was implemented there was a significant 
improvement in performance with a corresponding reduction in costs 
(see Table 1).  The IRS competitions exemplify the extraordinary 
outcomes that can be achieved through competitive sourcing when 
agency leadership is committed to investing time and effort in serious 
planning for competitions and when business case analyses are used 
in the planning process.   
With the implementation of the ODIN program NASA met its 
overall objectives and benefited from other positive results.  The 
primary objective of increasing employee focus on core tasks and 
increasing security were met, but perhaps more importantly, NASA 
saw improvements in service delivery and service consistency.  With 
the ODIN model, NASA managers have visibility of the true IT support 
cost, and, as a result, NASA was able to lower per seat costs.  By 
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having several qualified contractors, NASA was able to maintain a 
competitive environment and sustain these savings over time. 
The Defense Logistics Agency’s contract with Hamilton Standard 
to supply components for the C-130 military cargo plane was the first  
  
TABLE 1 
Summary of Case Results 





Reduced operations from 
3 to 1 site, reengineered 
processes, and enhanced 
the use of technology. 







significantly reduced FTEs, 
and enhanced the use of 
technology. 
78% reduction of 
workforce 
Outsourcing NASA ODIN •  Exceeded required 
service levels. 
•  Hardware/software 
were standardized at each 
center. 
•  Interoperability and 
security were much 
improved.  
From no adequate 
way to allocate IT 




C-130 Parts Surpassed all required 
performance metrics.  
Inventory reduced 








70% to 90%. 
• # of APUs awaiting depot 
repair from 118 to zero.  
• Avg. delivery time from 
35 to 5.4 days.  
• 98 % of requisitions 
filled within contract 
limits. 
Savings of $13.8 
million over ten 
years plus other 
quantitative 
benefits totaling 
$34.8 million  
Privatization-
in-Place 









attempt to apply the VPV concept to a key component of a major 
weapon system.  It is clear that the reduction in costs was not done at 
the expense of quality.  The study shows that when requirements are 
adequately defined, quality does not have to be sacrificed.  In the 
public-private-partnership arrangement to supply C-130 parts the DLA 
reduced its overall costs with a 98 percent reduction in inventory. The 
vendor, Hamilton Sundstrand, managed to achieve this cost 
reduction, while still surpassing all contractual performance metrics. 
Using performance-based metrics helped to align the contractor’s 
profit motive with the government agency’s performance objective. 
Instead of performing the activity, the agency is now able to procure a 
result, and better able to focus on its core competencies. 
The Navy’s Auxiliary Power Unit contract incentivized the 
contractor to reduce the numbers of failures; and that meant 
reliability improvements had to be made to the APUs themselves, the 
technical publications, and the training, all at the contractor’s 
expense.  This program leveraged the private sector’s ability to 
procure piece-parts and rapid delivery with investment funds for high-
payoff modifications, with the Navy’s ability to provide craftsman and 
skilled labor.  The result is a high-quality product, with reduced critical 
maintenance manpower requirements and operational costs. 
Finally, in the case of the Naval Ordnance Station in Louisville, the 
privatization allowed the Navy to eliminate the overhead costs of 
operating the depot, improved the quality and efficiency of the 
support, while allowing the private sector to rationalize the excess 
depot capacity. 
Based on the analysis of these cases the following are the key 
lessons learned:   
 Market based government initiatives require strong leadership.  
These cases demonstrate that implementing an effective market-
based government program requires a major cultural change 
within the affected organizations, as well as changing the beliefs 
of many of the stakeholders.  Achieving this transformation 
required committed senior leadership.  This leadership was 
required to develop the strategy, conduct the planning, and then 
follow through with the execution.  Leaders were continuously 
focused on creating the best value for the government—not just 
looking for the lowest cost solution.   
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 Thorough planning is essential.  Good planning was another 
critical element in these successful market-based government 
experiences.  The leadership in these cases all approached their 
challenge from a strategic enterprise perspective, and viewed this 
as an opportunity to restructure and reengineer their 
organizations.  Once a process or function was identified, a 
detailed business case analysis was done to determine if it would 
be beneficial to move ahead with the initiative.  This process 
proved valuable, independent of the results, since it provided a 
better understanding of the organization—what they did, why they 
did it, and how much it cost. Finally, the planning always 
considered the impact on the employees, and made every effort 
to minimize that impact. 
 Improve cost accounting to inform market-based government 
initiatives.  The capability to identify the true cost of an activity is 
critical to discovering opportunities for cost improvement, to 
prepare a business case analysis, and improve strategic decision 
making.  Traditional government cost accounting systems often 
mask the true costs associated with producing items or 
performing services making it difficult, if not impossible to 
compare various sourcing options.  Organizations should work 
toward developing financial systems with a capability to identify 
the true costs (direct and indirect) of performing commercial 
activities.   
 Get the facts and make them widely available.  Improving 
communication both within government agencies themselves and 
with external stakeholders greatly reduced resistance and 
improved the environment in which these sourcing decisions were 
made. For example, in many instances opposition to market-
based government initiatives was founded in fears that the 
changes would result in poorer performance, higher costs, and 
significant job losses for government employees.  These fears are 
generally unfounded; as these cases show, performance 
improves, costs are reduced, and the rate of involuntary job loss 
is low.  
Communicating such findings is key to creating a friendlier 
environment and reducing the resistance to change.  Additionally, 
carefully framing and clearly communicating the intentions and 
plans of agencies considering any form of market-based sourcing 
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can go a long way toward allaying the fear of market-based 
sourcing among government workers, unions, and the public. 
 Maintain a competitive environment.  The benefits of market-
based government are achieved only if there is an open and fair 
competitive environment.  Competitive sourcing, in particular, 
depends on the competitive pressure of the private sector to 
shape the government’s Most Efficient Organization (MEO) 
proposal.   
CONCLUSION 
Market-based government is one of many tools the federal 
governments can use to achieve greater effectiveness and 
efficiencies.  The ultimate goal is not to shift work to the private 
sector, but to introduce competition with these sourcing strategies, 
then push for innovation that will result in that improved government 
performance and efficiency.  As demonstrated in this study, four 
different approaches all resulted in improved performance and 
reduced costs.  With proper planning the impact to government 
employees was kept to a minimum. 
This approach can also be effectively used to transition these 
decisions from an ideological framework to a more pragmatic 
approach—allowing the most effective provider, from either the public 
or private sector, to provide the required service.  With continued use, 
acceptance should follow.  These initiatives improve the overall 
effectiveness and efficiency with which the government functions and 
through which it provides its citizens services—a welcome change for 
everyone. 
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NOTES 
1. The executive branch first addressed the performance of 
commercial activities by government agencies in 1955—see 
Bureau of the Budget’s Bulletin 55-4, Commercial-Industrial 
Activities of the Government Providing Products or Services for 
Governmental Use (January 15, 1955).  The current policy that 
addresses the performance of commercial activities is contained 
in OMB Circular A-76. The circular was originally issued in 1966, 
and has been revised several times.  The most recent revision 
was released in May 2003.  
2. A term first used by Bush to describe the competition of 
commercial activities performed by the government between the 
public and private sectors. 
3. Competitive sourcing involves agencies opening their commercial 
activities to competition from both public and private sector 
sources, and the rules of competition are set forth in the Office of 
Management and Budget’s (OMB) newly-revised Circular A-76.  A 
commercial activity is one which is operated by a Federal 
executive agency, and which provides a product or service that 
could be obtained from a commercial source. 
4. An APU is a self-contained generator used in aircraft to start the 
engines and provide electrical power while the aircraft is on the 
ground. 
5 The C-130 is a four-engine turboprop cargo aircraft used for airlift 
of equipment, people, and supplies.  
6. Hamilton Sundstrand was formed by the merger of United 
Technologies’ Hamilton Standard Division with the Sundstrand 
Corporation in 1999. 
7. CPT is defined as the number of days from the date the delivery 
order is issued to the date that the total quantity order is shipped, 
and it applies to each delivery order individually. TOB is defined 
as the vendor’s average time for delivery of back-ordered items 
as well as the average time for all back-ordered delivery orders 
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